Why is Trump delaying a Saudi deal that allows uranium enrichment | World News

US President Donald Trump and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. (File Photo)

The Trump adminration has tentatively agreed to let Saudi Arabia enrich uranium without the strict international safeguards normally used to stop countries building nuclear weapons, according to sources and documents seen CNN.

The draft deal covering Riyadh’s civilian nuclear programme is still waiting for President Trump’s signature, even though talks between the US and Saudi Arabia wrapped up back in October 2025.

Why is the deal stuck?

Two sources familiar with the matter said the ongoing war with Iran, which Trump has said was partly launched to stop Tehran from using enriched uranium for weapons, has helped delay his signature. Some on Capitol Hill also believe the adminration is holding off because the deal could face a bipartisan disapproval resolution that would block it from taking effect.

President Donald Trump and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman exchange documents during a signing ceremony at the Royal Palace, Tuesday. (AP)

Four sources said the agreement, which includes a civil nuclear cooperation pact known as a “123 agreement” plus a separate safeguards agreement, still hasn’t been sent to Congress for review, as the law requires once it’s signed.

The White House did not answer CNN’s questions and instead pointed to an October 2025 statement from Energy Secretary Chris Wright, who said the two countries had reached a deal on civil nuclear cooperation alongside bilateral safeguards.Story continues below this ad

What worries experts about the terms

The deal reportedly includes a special arrangement letting Saudi Arabia enrich uranium and possibly reprocess plutonium domestically — something a source called unprecedented for this type of agreement.

Enrichment and reprocessing are the two main routes to producing the material needed for a nuclear bomb; most countries buy already-enriched uranium from suppliers like the US or Russia rather than making it themselves.

The draft also doesn’t require Saudi Arabia to sign up to the IAEA’s Additional Protocol, an enhanced safeguards standard. Instead, oversight would come only through a bilateral safeguards agreement between the US and the kingdom. That’s a marked departure from the 2009 deal with the United Arab Emirates, in which the UAE accepted the Additional Protocol and agreed to forgo enrichment and reprocessing altogether, an arrangement nuclear experts consider the “gold standard” for such deals.

Kelsey Davenport of the Arms Control Association said the Additional Protocol exs specifically to give the IAEA more access, after it became clear that basic safeguards agreements alone weren’t enough to stop countries from edging toward nuclear weapons.Story continues below this ad

President Donald Trump shakes hands with Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman during a dinner in the East Room of the White House in Washington. (AP Photo)

Andrea Stricker of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies argued this is exactly the wrong moment to loosen standards, since without the Additional Protocol, the IAEA would have fewer rights to inspect undeclared sites.

She said there’s no safe way to allow enrichment or reprocessing on Saudi soil, even under American control, warning the Saudis could eventually nationalise such a facility, or that trained technicians could take their knowledge elsewhere pointing to how Pakan’s weapons programme is believed to have started with centrifuge know-how obtained abroad.

Not everyone shares that alarm. Dan Joyner, a nuclear law professor at the University of Alabama, said the absence of the Additional Protocol isn’t itself a red flag, and that the adequacy of the deal depends on terms that haven’t yet been made public. He believes the commercial and strategic benefits of working with Saudi Arabia outweigh the residual proliferation risk, noting that if Washington doesn’t strike a deal, Russia or China might offer Riyadh looser terms instead.

Why does this matter beyond Saudi Arabia?

Davenport warned that allowing Saudi Arabia to have a “bespoke” safeguards arrangement could set a precedent that other powers might exploit, asking how the US would feel if Russia began pushing for similar bilateral safeguards with other countries rather than tougher IAEA standards.Story continues below this ad

US President Donald Trump speaks during a dinner with Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in the East Room of the White House. (Photo: AP)

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has previously said he would seek his own nuclear weapon if regional rival Iran ever obtained one, adding to the stakes around how tightly the eventual deal is written.